Malayalam Bhasha Bill 2025 & Karnataka

Context: A day after Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan sought to allay fears of Kannada linguistic minority in Kerala about the Malayalam Bhasha Bill 2025, the Karnataka Border Area Development Authority (KBADA) has said that the Bill should explicitly exempt linguistic minority areas (parts of Kasaragod district) in the mandatory Malayalam first language clause — allowing Kannada to remain the first language, and also remove the inherent contradictions in the Bill.

• While Mr. Vijayan pointed out provisions in Clause 7 of the Bill to allay fears of the Kannada-speaking population, the authority pointed out contradictions in the provisions that was also leading to confusion.
• The assessment of the Karnataka government was that under the proposed legislation, those studying in Kannada medium would also need to study Malayalam as a compulsory subject/first language, affecting those who are unfamiliar with that language.

Academic performance

• It could affect the academic performance adversely and Kannada’s primacy would also get eroded over time. It may disrupt existing set-ups where Kannada was the first language, sources aware of the assessment said.
• This comes amidst concerns aired by Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah over the adverse effects of the Bill on the Kannada-speaking population in Kerala.
• The sources said that the Kerala government through the Bill should accelerate declaration of specific taluks in Kasaragod district as minority areas under the Bill and secure full benefit of Clause 7 in it that provided for bilingual signboards and teachers’ appointments in Kannada, among others.
• The authority chairman Somanna Bevinamarad is learnt to have echoed similar sentiments.
• An estimate puts the Kannada-speaking people in Kasargod to be more than 70% of the population.

Contradictions

• According to Prakash Matthihalli, secretary of the authority, despite protections in Clause 7 (special provisions regarding linguistic minorities) in the Bill, there were contradictions and difficulties in implementation.

• He said that while Clause 6(1) mandated Malayalam as the compulsory first language in all government and aided schools in Kerala up to 10th standard, Clause 7(1) provided for communication of all letters and transactions in local offices in the local language.
• “However, as per Clause 7(2) students whose mother tongue is any language other than Malayalam may pursue their studies in the languages of their choice that are available in the schools. When the second language English is compulsory in national education curriculum in Kerala, how can a student opt Kannada as first language when Clause 6(1) says Malayalam is mandatory across the State?”
• Further, Clause 7(3) that spoke of students from other States and foreign countries whose mother tongue was not Malayalam, provided for exemption only in 9th and 10th standards. “Clause 7 should explicitly specify the exemption to linguistic minorities areas.”
• Mr. Matthihalli said the Karnataka government had no problem with the Bill if the ambiguities in the provisions were cleared and it exempted the Kannada-speaking regions.

Karnataka’s border districts host significant linguistic minorities such as Marathi speakers in Belagavi, Telugu in Ballari and Raichur, Tamil in Bengaluru and Kolar, Malayalam in Kodagu, and Urdu across urban centers. The Indian Constitution protects these communities under Articles 29 and 30 (cultural and educational rights), Article 347 (recognition of languages), and Article 350A & 350B (instruction in mother tongue and linguistic minority commissioner).

🗣️ Linguistic Minorities in Karnataka
📍 Border Districts & Communities

📜 Constitutional Provisions for Linguistic Minorities

⚖️ Current Issues
Belagavi Dispute: Maharashtra claims Marathi-speaking areas; Karnataka asserts Kannada primacy.

Kasaragod Issue: Kerala’s Malayalam Bhasha Bill 2025 raised fears of marginalization of Kannada minorities in Kasaragod.

Education Rights: Linguistic minorities demand mother-tongue instruction in border schools.

Kathputli: pulling strings in Jaipur’s puppet colony

In this Jaipur corner, nearly 250 families carry forward one of Rajasthan’s oldest folk art forms, Kathputli; these artisans sew bright costumesonto small wooden puppets that are used by travelling performers who narrate tales of Rajput kings, warriors, folk heroes, and moral stories
In a maze of narrow lanes in the ‘Pink City’ of Jaipur lies Kathputli Nagar, a place where stories are not written but carved, stitched, and brought to life with strings. Inside cramped homes stacked close together, men and women sit on the floor, shaping small wooden faces, painting bold eyes, and sewing vibrant costumes. Nearly 250 families live here, many of them have been preserving the craft for generations. What begins in their modest homes eventually finds its way to bustling markets, cultural fairs, and stages across the world.

These puppets, known as Kathputlis, are one of Rajasthan’s oldest folk art forms. The name comes from kath (wood) and putli (doll), reflecting their simple yet expressive construction. Historically, Kathputli performances were used by travelling performers to narrate tales of Rajput kings, brave warriors, folk heroes, and moral stories to village audiences. Long before modern forms of entertainment, Kathputlis were a powerful medium of communication.

The design of these Rajasthani puppets mirrors the State’s rich culture. Their colourful attire draw inspiration from royal courts and desert traditions, while their sharp features and exaggerated expressions add drama to every movement. Each puppet represents a character from everyday life or folklore, helping preserve the State’s social and cultural identity.

Puppet shows remain the soul of this tradition. Accompanied by folk music on the dholak and harmonium, puppeteers bring the Kathputlis to life with strings and rhythmic narration. The performances brim with humour, music, and satire, often reflecting social realities alongside legendary tales. From the homes of Kathputli Nagar to bigger stages, Kathputlis continue to carry Rajasthan’s voice across generations.

Source: The Hindu

How will the U.S. exit affect climate action?

Why has U.S. President Donald Trump moved to withdraw the U.S. from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change? What will be the financial impact? What will it mean for international cooperation on climate change?’
U.S. President Donald Trump has signed a presidential memorandum withdrawing from 66 international organisations, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

What does the U.S. exiting the FCCC mean?

Mr. Trump has been calling climate change a hoax. His government is also currently in the process of pulling the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. On February 4, 2025, he issued an executive order requiring the government “to determine which organisations, conventions, and treaties [to which the U.S. is party] are contrary” to its interests. His decision to exit the FCCC and the IPCC are based on this review.

Pulling out of the FCCC will exclude the U.S. from the core framework that organises almost all multilateral climate diplomacy. For instance, it won’t have to participate in the FCCC reporting system, which records countries’ greenhouse gas emissions and progress towards their commitments, and thus allows nations to monitor their collective efforts and hold each other accountable. Legally, the FCCC provides a way for countries to withdraw should they see fit. The FCCC also says withdrawing from it is treated as withdrawing from any protocol to which the party belongs. This includes the Paris Agreement. In practical terms, this means the U.S. will cease to be a party inside the system that runs the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) negotiations and the processes by which the rules are drafted for transparency, carbon markets, financial architecture, etc. The country will also lose its ability to negotiate from inside the room at COPs even if it can still attend some meetings as an observer. However, it won’t have the legal standing to bargain as a party.

How will climate finance be affected?

The FCCC has established a financial mechanism with operating entities including the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, and the COP oversees the arrangements of that mechanism. If the U.S. isn’t a party, it will lose its leverage inside the COP over how that financial architecture evolves while also making it politically easier for a U.S. administration to justify withholding contributions.

Conversely, the exit will also raise the ‘cost of doing climate business’ for U.S. companies. Many private sector enterprises, investors, insurers, and subnational governments currently plan around the expectation that global climate rules will become tighter over time, so the U.S.’s decision to exit the FCCC could signal more policy volatility, in turn increasing risk premiums and leaving U.S. exporters more exposed to foreign climate-related trade measures. For many partner countries climate cooperation has become tied up with broader negotiations on energy security, critical minerals, industrial policy, and development finance. The potential implication here is that countries may now become more unwilling to cut side deals with Washington in adjacent domains because they will have to account for the durability of the U.S.’s commitments.

What does the IPCC do?

The IPCC assesses scientific research on climate change, compiling reports that synthesise the current understanding of climate science, the consequences, and potential strategies policymakers everywhere can implement. Pulling out of the IPCC would weaken the U.S.’s role in owning the shared scientific references climate negotiations rely on. This doesn’t automatically mean “American scientists will no longer be involved in climate reports” but it likely will reduce U.S. involvement. The IPCC reports’ authors are put together by a process in which governments and observer organisations nominate experts and the IPCC Bureau creates teams. If the U.S. stops nominating, an important pipeline for U.S.-based expertise — which is considerable — becomes narrower.

This said, the IPCC explicitly encourages experts who are nominated but not selected to contribute as expert reviewers. This role is open and large in scope and U.S. researchers could still participate if their government steps back. U.S. scientists can also still be nominated via non-government routes, for example, by observer organisations.

What are the global repercussions?

The climate talks run on reciprocity. When a very wealthy country with high emissions decides to quit, it weakens the expectation that other major players will also play by the same shared rules. This in turn can harden poor countries’ positions; these countries already believe their rich counterparts promise more than they deliver. It can also give cover to other reluctant governments to delay or dilute action.

The timing is also unfortunate because the conversation on climate finance has shifted from the older $100 billion goal towards much larger needs and new targets. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, economically developed countries mobilised $115.9 billion in climate finance in 2022, the first time it exceeded $100 billion. However, adaptation finance remains far below the need: the UN Adaptation Gap Report 2025 estimated it to be $310-365 billion per year by 2035 while international public adaptation finance flows were about $26 billion in 2023.

At the COP29 summit in 2024, governments agreed to a new collective quantified goal of at least $300 billion per year by 2035. The U.S. exiting the world’s main climate action bodies makes it harder to make credible deals to reach these numbers because other countries will ask why they should pay more when a major historical emitter is stepping away.

Source: The Hindu

India’s 2025 rice exports surge to near record as curbs lifted

India’s rice exports jumped 19.4% last year to the second-highest on record after New Delhi lifted all export curbs, making shipments more competitive, government and industry officials told Reuters.

An improved flow of rice from the world’s largest exporter of the grain curbed shipments from rivals Thailand and Vietnam and drove prices in Asia to their lowest in nearly a decade, easing costs for poor consumers in Africa and other regions.

Quick rebound

“Indian shipments rebounded quickly after the government lifted export restrictions” in March, said a government official, who asked not to be named as he was not authorised to speak to the media.

As supplies improved with record production, India removed the last of the export curbs imposed in 2022 and 2023.

Exports rose to 21.55 million metric tons from 18.05 million in 2024, near the 2022 record of 22.3 million tons, the official said.

Non-basmati rice shipments jumped 25% to 15.15 million tons, while basmati exports increased 8% to a record 6.4 million tons, he said.

Non-basmati rice shipments rose sharply to Bangladesh, Benin, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Djibouti, while Iran, the UAE and Britain increased purchases of premium basmati rice during the year, said another government official.

‘Shifting from Russian oil imports will currently not hurt India financially’

Data shows that while the premium paid on oil from the U.S. has remained largelythe same as three years ago, the discount received from Russia has shrunk considerably
The prevailing low global oil prices mean that, if India chooses to shift away from importing Russian oil and switches to more oil from the U.S., the financial impact of this would be limited, according to experts as well an analysis of India’s import data.

An analysis by The Hindu of the volume and value of India’s oil imports show that in November 2025, the latest month for which there is data, India imported oil from Russia at the rate of $482.7 per tonne.

That month, oil imports from the U.S. cost $523.3 per tonne. On average, India paid $498.8 per tonne for its oil imports in November 2025.

In other words, in November 2025, India received an average discount of $16.1 per tonne from Russia, while it bought oil at an average premium of $24.6 per tonne from the U.S.

Declining discount

Data shows that, while the premium paid on oil from the U.S. has remained largely the same as three years ago, the discount received from Russia has shrunk considerably.

Three years earlier, in November 2022, India received a discount of $40.3 a tonne on its oil imports from Russia. The premium paid on American oil stood at $21.2 per tonne.

“India was very keen to keep importing from Russia at a discounted rate while a discount existed,” Vibhuti Garg, Director for South Asia at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, said.

“But that discount has now gone and global oil prices have fallen significantly. They are at about $60 a barrel and could fall further. So, if India does cut down on its Russian oil imports significantly, this won’t currently be damaging fiscally.

However, she added that, if in the future prices go back up to $80-90 a barrel, then the lack of this Russian discount could start pinching the Indian government. A previous report by The Hindu shows how India’s oil imports from Russia touched a six-month high in November 2025.

However, since then, Reliance Industries, one of the biggest oil importers in India, said that it had not received any oil shipments from Russia in the last three weeks of December 2025 and did not expect any in January 2026.

Limited impact

According to Ajay Srivastava, founder of think-tank Global Trade Research Initiative and former Director General of Foreign Trade in the Government of India, the premium paid to the U.S. also reflects the superior quality of the oil supplied by it.

“Until 2023-24, Russian oil was about 20% cheaper than what we could get in the market,” Mr. Srivastava said. “That price differential has evaporated since then. There is also a quality difference between the oil that we get from Russia and the US. Russian oil is largely heavy crude, with a higher sulfur content, which is considered lower quality, while the US crude is lighter and of better quality.” He added that reducing oil imports from Russia would not have any financial impact on India.

“While strategic concerns are different, economically it will not make much of a difference,” Mr. Srivastava said.

Other risks arise

Puneet Kumar, Partner, Energy Sector at EY-Parthenon India said that, with about 35% of India’s oil imports originating in Russia, there is a risk to India from cutting down on Russian oil. But he, too, acknowledged that this risk is currently likely to be offset due to the low global oil prices.

However, he pointed out other factors that could put a strain on India’s finances if they persist.

“These gains would be partially negated by other economic factors, including recent depreciation of the Indian rupee (around 5% this year) and increased logistics cost from U.S.,” Mr. Kumar said.